Several airpower experts in the Air Force, and Navy, have argued for the creation of a third counterland mission, termed "Direct Attack" (DA). This mission would reflect lessons from Operations ALLIED FORCE (OAF), ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and articulate airpower's capability to operate "as a scheme of maneuver against enemy military forces, irrespective of the presence of friendly surface forces." To date the USAF has rejected the proposal for DA, choosing instead to broaden the definition of air interdiction (AI). This paper contends that broadening the definition of AI better serves the USAF than creating DA. Interviews with officers from the Air Force Doctrine Center and secondary sources (e.g. RAND reports, SAASS papers, books) reveal four arguments against creating DA: 1) USAF senior leadership concern that DA does not foster "jointness"; 2) airpower's inherent capability as a maneuver element and the move toward effects-based operations (EBO) do not necessitate the new mission; 3) DA will not solve the difficult issue of placement of the fire support coordination line (FSCL) and inhibits flexibility on a dynamic battlefield; and 4) from the aircrew's perspective DA does not differ from AI, and does not warrant a new doctrinal mission for training. The paper offers recommendations to address doctrinal deficiencies. These include the need for better definitions of supported and supporting relationships for air interdiction, improved command and control networks for the combined air operations center, and development of effects-based basic doctrine mission descriptions.