The Donald J. Trump presidency from its outset has had to deal with long-unresolved domestic and international challenges. The domestic issues are recurring - budgets, elections, immigration, citizenship, and other difficulties. Some international problems carried over from previous administrations go back to the Cold War, especially regarding Korea, Ukraine, Russia, Afghanistan, and the Mid-East.This analysis of challenges now faced by the Trump administration is extracted from my more comprehensive 684pp book Cold War Brinkmanship (Amazon, 2017), which includes a personal and technical narrative, as well as some in-depth coverage of issues.The 60s, 70s, and early 80s were churned by domestic and international discord. Our mood was dampened by seemingly endless public crises kindled by evolving Cold War threats. Fatalism (about lifespan that might be shortened by a looming nuclear war) gradually spread all around, especially when hawkish brinkmanship (dangerous situations pushed to the threshold of disaster) increased the risk of atomic incineration.This book is an historical narrative by someone professionally and uniquely familiar with the complex technology exploited in war. No matter how much on the topic you've read, none has been authored by anyone with my combination of relevant technical experience, nuclear insight, and personal participation.The Cold War became the framework for military conflicts around the world, including an East-West standoff about Berlin, the Iron Curtain's evolution, the devastating Korean War, a traumatic Cuban Missile Crisis, and the extended conflict in Indochina. The dominant Washington-beltway-bandit themes of "doomsday" and "brinkmanship" became the center of think-tank attention. There were other phrases too, such as the Doomsday Machine, which did little to calm public fear. A strategic launch-on-warning doctrine was dominant: Nuclear-armed bombers and missiles could be set in motion within minutes - just a few fingers away from unforgivable decisions on mutual destruction.Efforts to prevent nuclear catastrophe became embodied in arms-control treaties negotiated between the two polarized adversaries. These treaties benefitted not only restless citizens but also reduced budgetary excesses.Even now there's no lack of residual problems. For example, Russia's brazen military annexation of Crimea and armed incursion into eastern Ukraine resulted in economic and diplomatic sanctions - by the Obama administration, the European Union, and NATO - thus complicating Trump's subsequent attempt at rapport with Putin. To the extent that American domestic politics does not intrude on foreign affairs and inter-government relations, President Trump can avoid dangerous situations that could escalate into nuclear confrontations.This is not just a memoir, nor autobiography: It's a recollection of our passage through a minefield of fateful Cold War situations. Most important as far as I'm concerned are the portentous lessons that emerged. This book identifies some residual Cold War obstacles that the Trump administration has to overcome.
Author Biography:
Educated in military school as part of the Silent Generation, I began commissioned active-duty service after college in the U.S. Navy during the last stages of the Korean War. For nearly 20 years I remained in the Reserves, which required annual 2-week stints at either the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington or the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory in San Francisco, retiring with the rank of Lieutenant Commander. After discharge from active duty, I enrolled at Virginia Tech under the GI Bill and earned an MS degree in nuclear engineering physics. That qualified me for a two-year Atoms for Peace program at Argonne National Laboratory near Chicago; upon completion I joined the Laboratory research staff, with assigned activities in nuclear and radiation technology. Gradually I augmented my formal education, earning a PhD degree in physics. By association and involvement, I became engaged in arms-control development programs at Argonne, carrying out technical analysis and engineering and working with NGOs such as the Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council. The NGOs were able to arrange strictly unofficial American/Soviet demonstrations and experiments with a corresponding Committee of Soviet Scientists to show that verification of proposed nuclear arms-control treaties was technically feasible, contrary to the prevailing view of doubters. I introduced an experienced technical perspective and provided a backchannel keeping U.S. government agencies informed of the unofficial overtures. It was an article of faith at the time that neither side could "trust" the other; so arms-control agreements had to be independently verifiable. Gradually I became fully occupied with Cold War arms-control and treaty-verification issues. My personal and professional involvements were sometimes met with administrative and government opposition, not all of which I found out about until after retirement from Argonne. I became at times a witness, notekeeper, author, and participant in endeavors regarding nuclear and conventional treaty negotiations. My technical qualifications and sympathetic orientation brought me into collaboration with several NGOs. And conversely, being a security-vetted employee of a U.s. national-laboratory provided government agencies, such as the Defense Nuclear Agency, an open window - despite my known anti-war inclinations - to keep abreast of ongoing NGO activities within official purview.
