National industrial subsidies are a major irritant in international trading relations. There have been many attempts to curb the damaging effects of subsidies on the international trading order; most have met with stiff opposition and mixed success. Today the combination of industrial subsidies and the countervailing duties intended to combat them present one of the major threats to the international trading order. Industrial Subsidies and Friction in World Trade is a comparative analysis of the instruments devised to regulate industrial subsidies and lessen the impact of countervailing duties. Some of these, such as the institutions of the newly created European Economic Area, are being analysed for the first time. The study contains a fresh review of the Canada-US FTA and NAFTA in light of their growing body of cases and a closer examination of the lessons of the EU and the EEA. Finally, the book takes an early look at the Uruguay Round Subsidies Code in order to determine the long-term prospects for its success. Industrial Subsidies and Friction in World Trade clearly shows how the differences in the regulatory mechanisms used in the EU and North America highlight the vast chasm between the two perspectives. Rambod Behboodi currently teaches a course on Economic Integration in the European Union at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. He is a member of the Bar of Ontario and practises mainly in the area of international trade law.