The acquisition of large amounts of foreign aid, handled improperly by a struggling economy, can weaken rather than strengthen it. This study reaches this conclusion by examining how the economic boom enjoyed by Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the 1970s turned into financial crisis by the 1980s. The analysis involves the political, economic and social similarities and differences among the three countries and pinpoints both the internal and external factors that contributed most significantly to their economic declines. Particular attention focuses on the huge influx of foreign aid that reached the region from 1978-81 and was used to advance purposes such as military buildups rather than enhance future economic growth potential. This left al three countries, regardless of their unique political structures, in economic chaos when outside funds ran out. The work outlines the economic developments and policies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan during the years of prosperity and crisis. Central to the discussion are the short and long-term ramifications of both this downturn and the countries' refusal to restrict military expenditures. After illustrating how foreign aid should, therefore, not be used, this volume then urges that well-being, and demonstrates how economic reform can be achieved only by initiating responsible economic programmes.