Architects of Political Change

Constitutional Quandaries and Social Choice Theory

By:

Norman Schofield

Format:

Hardback

Series:

Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

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Description

This work offers a set of extended interpretations of Madison's argument in Federalist X of 1787, using ideas from social choice theory and from the work of Douglass North, Mancur Olson, and William Riker. Its focus is not on rational choice theory itself, but on the use of this theory as a heuristic device to better understand democratic institutions. The treatment adapts a formal model of elections to consider rapid constitutional change at periods when societies face quandaries. The topics explored in the book include Britain's reorganization of its fiscal system in the eighteenth century to prosecute its wars with France; the Colonies' decision to declare independence in 1776; Madison's argument about the 'probability of fit choice' during the Ratification period of 1787-88; the argument between Hamilton and Jefferson in 1798–1800 over the long run organization of the US economy and the election of Lincoln in 1860.

Author Biography:

Norman Schofield is Taussig Professor of Political Economy at Washington University in St. Louis. He has served as Fulbright Distinguished Professor of American Studies at Humboldt University Berlin in 2003–04, a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford in 1988–89, and Shrman Fairchild Distinguished Scholar at the California Institute of Technology in 1983–84. Professor Schofield is the author of Mathematical Methods in Economics and Social Choice (2003), Multiparty Government (coauthored with Michael Laver, 1990), and Social Choice and Democracy (1985). He received the William Riker Prize in 2002 for contributions to political theory and is co-recipient with Gary Miller of the Jack L. Walker Prize for the best article on political organizations and parties in the American Political Science Review for 2002–04.

Release date NZ

June 5th, 2006

Author

Norman Schofield

Audience

Professional & Vocational

Illustrations

8 Tables, unspecified

Pages

336

Series

Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

Dimensions

161x236x22

ISBN-13

9780521832021

Product ID

2398886

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