Excerpt from Assessing Competition in the Market for Corporate Acquisitions: November 1981 Since the managerial objective function is unknown, I develop the conditions for rivalry under stockholder wealth maximization in section and managerial welfare maximization in section When an objective of shareholder wealth maximization is assumed, rivalry is characterized in terms of the gain that accrues to potential bidding firms; the price of the target firm rises until the acquisition is a nonnegative net present value investment for only the successful bidder. Under managerial welfare maximization, the offer price rises until only the successful bidder's management realizes an increase in welfare from the acquisition. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.