Enemies in Agreement

Why do adversaries sometimes cooperate to restrain their military competition? Why do they design arms control agreements with intrusive verification in some cases but rely on minimal transparency in others? Amidst ongoing international competition, arms control remains rare despite potential mutual benefits, and agreements vary dramatically in their approaches to monitoring. This book reveals how uncertainty from domestic political changes-such as leadership transitions or social unrest- can enable arms control. It identifies two paths to agreement: during periods of uncertainty, states that previously relied on informal understandings hedge by establishing lightly-monitored agreements, while those that anticipated deception take calculated risks through agreements with intensive verification. Through comprehensive data analysis and rich case studies, Jane Vaynman challenges conventional wisdom about uncertainty in international relations while offering insights for policymakers. As states confront challenges from nuclear competition to emerging technologies, understanding when arms control becomes viable is more vital than ever.

Author Biography

Jane Vaynman is an Assistant Professor of Strategic Studies in the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. She received her Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University and B.A. in international relations from Stanford University. Dr. Vaynman has been Lightning Scholar at Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania, a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and a Fulbright Fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center. From 2022-2024 she also served a senior advisor in the Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability at the US Department of State.