Credible Threats in Negotiations

In this title, the modern theory of threats in bargaining situations is presented in a unified and systematic treatment. Harold Houba and Wilko Bolt provide a synthesis of the fundamental results obtained in the rapidly expanding game-theoretic literature. The relative impacts of the fundamental forces on the bargaining outcome are discussed and related to the visions expressed by Nobel-laureate John Nash. Many topics – such as robustness of the results with respect to the diversity of known bargaining procedures, the role of commitment and policy bargaining situations – receive extensive treatment. The work should be suitable as a textbook for graduate students in economic theory and other social sciences and a necessity as a resource for scholars interested in bargaining situations.

Author Biography

Harold Houba is economist at the Centre of World Food Studies, Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam. He was educated at Tilburg University, both Masters and Ph.D. and has been Assistant Professor of Economic Theory for about ten years at the department of Econometrics and Operations Research at the Vrije Universiteit. The list of topics published include Bargaining Theory and Game Theory, among other topics, in journals as European Economic Review, Economic Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics and Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.

Wilko Bolt is economist at the Research Department of De Nederlandsche Bank in Amsterdam. He was educated at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, both Masters and Ph.D., and joined De Nederlandsche Bank afterwards. The list of topics published include Bargaining Theory and Monetary Economics among other topics, in journals as American Economic Review, European Economic Review and Economic Theory.