In Vietnam, Gary R. Hess describes and evaluates the main arguments of scholars, participants, and journalists, both revisionist and orthodox in their approach, as they try to answer fundamental questions of the Vietnam War. * Clearly examines the historiography of the Vietnam War * Questions whether the Vietnam War was lost due to poor strategy and leadership, or was inherently doomed to failure * Includes a bibliographic essay which complements the literature discussed in the text
Table of Contents
Preface. 1. From the Streets to the Books: The Origins of an Enduring Debate. 2. A Necessary War or a Mistaken War?. 3. "Kennedy Exceptionalism" or "Missed Opportunity for Peace" or "Lost Victory" -- The Movement toward War, 1961--1965. 4. The Revisionist Critique of the "Strategy for Defeat" -- The Clausewitzian Alternative. 5. The Revisionist Critique of the "Other War" -- The "Hearts-and-Minds" Prescription for Victory. 6. The Media and the War: Shaping or Reflecting Public Opinion?. 7. The Tet Offensive: A Decisive American Victory or Prolongation of Stalemate?. 8. Nixon--Kissinger and the Ending of the War: A "Lost Victory" or "Neither Peace nor Honor?". 9. Conclusion. Bibliography. Index
Gary R. Hess is Distinguished Research Professor of History at Bowling Green State University. He is a past president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations and a former chair of the U.S. State Department's Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation. His publications include Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War 1941-1945 (1998) and Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf (2001).