This book includes Roger J. Spiller's Not War But Like War: The American Intervention in Lebanon and Major General David W. Gray's The U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958: A Commander's Reminiscence. Not War, But Like War offers insights that are readily applicable to today's military planners at all levels. The disparity between the political purpose and the military objective of intervention will illustrate why national and service level planners must carefully describe what is to be accomplished by theater military forces. Theater and tactical level commanders and planners will be reminded that the nature of joint operations demands detailed preparation of command and logistical arrangements and concerted operations. Finally, the study demonstrates that responsive contingency planning also depends upon a process that promotes both participant dialogue and repetitive review in order to lessen the dangers of "provisionalism." In The U.S. Intervention in Lebanon General Gray provided answers to specific questions about logistics, as well as his recollections of the Lebanon operation and a critique of Not War But Like War. His manuscript not only contained a detailed and candid account of his activities, but amplified, elaborated, and sometimes disputed Dr. Spiller's work. In this sense, it is both an important eyewitness account and a companion piece to Not War But Like War. The reader of both publications will benefit from being able to draw upon the scholarly work of a trained historian and the memoir of an actual participant. The historical record could not be better served.