This work covers the Battle of Normandy from the point of view of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel from December 1943, until he was critically wounded on July 17, 1944, examining the effect the "Desert Fox" had on the toughening and evolution of the German defence in Normandy and elsewhere. It describes how and why Rommel's absence on D-Day significantly weakened the German reaction to the Allied landings, and how he temporarily checked, though he could not repulse, the Anglo-American invasion and ultimate victory. In addition, the work documents the reinforcements Rommel wanted to pour into Normandy in the six weeks prior to the D-Day landings, after he had analyzed the Allied bombing pattern and discovered that they were trying to make Normandy a strategic island - to isolate the battlefield. The author also provides a theory of why Allied intelligence failed to learn that the excellent and well-equipped 352nd Infantry Division took over most of the coastal sector from the poorly-equipped 716th Infantry Division. French intelligence sent messenger pigeons to inform Allied armies of the stronger German presence. But Rommel had ordered soldiers all along the coast to shoot pigeons! The Allies never got the message and thus were not prepared for the heavier German resistance. This study contains Admiral Friedrich Ruge's rebuttal of David Irving's portrait of Rommel and his chief of staff, published in Irving's best-seller "The Trail of the Fox", a rebuttal which casts serious doubts on the validity of many of Irving's highly coloured and distorted conclusions. This book also makes use of a number of rarely used primary sources, including "Foreign Military Studies", which contains the manuscripts of General of Panzer Troops Baron Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg, the commander of Panzer Group West and one of Rommel's principle subordinates. Among the topics von Schweppenburg discusses are the evolution of panzer tactics in Normandy, his assessment of Rommel and his leadership, his memories of the battle (including the air attack on his headquarters), and his surprisingly candid evaluation of the other commanders and staff involved in the Normandy campaign.