In a collective enterprise, fourteen leading social scientists have worked closely to explore the power network connecting U.S. corporate structure with other key sectors of the society. In clear, non-technical terms, the contributors examine such issues as interlocking boards, business control of banks, the government as an agent of the ruling class, the "cap-ture" of regulatory agencies by the businesses they were supposed to regulate, and penetration of various U.S. insti-tutions by a corporate "inner group." In addition, this volume contains the first general analysis of the structure of intercorporate co-ordination among multinational businesses and the expression of business interest in educa-tional systems, transportation policy, urban investment, and academic political theory. Together the essays address not only the processes of cor-porate decision making and policy formation, but also the vulnerability of the elite to mass discontent, the fragility of its role in the face of mass action.