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Delegation and Agency in International Organizations

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Description

Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than at domestic level and, drawing on principal-agent theory, help explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political masters.

Author Biography:

Darren G. Hawkins is Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at Brigham Young University. David A. Lake is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. Daniel L. Nielson is Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at Brigham Young University. Michael J. Tierney is Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at The College of William & Mary.
Release date NZ
September 14th, 2006
Audience
  • Professional & Vocational
Contributors
  • Edited by Daniel L. Nielson
  • Edited by Darren G. Hawkins
  • Edited by David A. Lake
  • Edited by Michael J. Tierney
Illustrations
23 Tables, unspecified
Pages
426
Dimensions
157x227x25
ISBN-13
9780521680462
Product ID
1820601

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