This study evaluates the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) support the Army receives from national systems. It reviews SIGINT support provided during Operation Joint Endeavor (1995) and during Operation Desert Capture II (1994) using the principles of intelligence defined in JCS Publication 24) as criteria. The existing systems for dissemination from the national level are insufficient to ensure consistent, rapid delivery of this information for timely prosecution of potential targets below the strategic or operational level of war. This study also reviews the systems and organizations that the Army has which can directly access current SIGINT disseminated from national systems. Analysis indicated that changes are possible and necessary to ensure rapid, timely delivery of SIGINT from national systems to Army commanders at division and corps on or before the decisive moment on the battlefield. This study advocates that DoD and NSA must develop, implement and enforce a comprehensive set of standards for SIGINT data dissemination. They must focus on narrowing the number of paths for dissemination to far fewer intelligence broadcasts that deliver the original SIGINT source information with other associated intelligence. The Army needs to train more soldiers on the capabilities of the national systems and on how to more accurately state their commanders' requirements so they can be satisfied by national systems.