Universality is not sufficient to distinguish laws of nature from accidental regularities. A multitude of additional defining features have been suggested. Yet, once it is acknowledged that exceptionless universality is not the only criterion for lawhood it is possible to start questioning whether it is necessary. Markus Schrenk's "The Metaphysics of Ceteris Paribus Laws" takes this bold step and it's provocative conclusion is that existing theories - especially David Lewis' and David Armstrong's - are, in fact, strong enough to guarantee lawhood even if there are instances that do not conform to the laws. Schrenk also advances two novel theories for special science ceteris paribus laws. His unorthodox exploration has the potential to stimulate a new debate about laws, lawhood and exceptions. This work has received the Award for Furthering Research in Ontology of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP).
Table of Contents
Introduction; Ceteris Paribus Laws; Real versus Pseudo Exceptions; Fundamental versus Non-fundamental Laws; Fundamental Laws: General Considerations; Fundamental Laws: David Lewis; Fundamental Laws: David Armstrong; Non-Fundamental Laws: General Considerations; Non-Fundamental Laws: Grounded Laws; Non-fundamental Laws: Emergent Laws; Conclusion; Index.