A decade has passed since the superpowers began a series of arms control initiatives which now symbolize the beginning of the end of the Cold War, but the passage of time has not resolved disputes about the role of arms control in preserving peace. Both international relations theorists and foreign policy practitioners must decide which security strategy is most appropriate for a post-Cold War world characterized by the decline in superpower hostility and the rise of regional rivalries; the rapid diffusion of knowledge-intensive technologies; and the increasingly complex relationships between political, military, and economic issues. How should arms control theory and policy be altered to improve the prospects for cooperation? The essays in this volume address this question by exploring the complexity of national arms control decision-making and multilateral negotiations, and the challenges of reaching domestic and international agreement on verification. Conscious that the gulf between theory and policy is growing at a time when the need for policy-friendly theory is greater than ever, the authors offer a range of jargon-free views from the academic and policy-making worlds, some arguing that growing interdependence creates both the need and the opportunity for a radical reorientation of arms control efforts, while others contend that increasing complexity in arms control problems still constrains what can be negotiated and ratified.